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1975/04/17



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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(with TOP SECRET Attachment)

April 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Study of Evacuation Planning Issues
and Options for Viet-Nam

Attached is a staff-level study of evacuation planning issues and options. The paper has been prepared for discussion at the WSAG meeting today, April 17.

Suzanne Stutcher
for George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By KAM, NARA, Date 2/10/00

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XGDS-3

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
VIETNAM EVACUATION

The basic dilemma in the consideration of the Vietnam evacuation issue is that in order to achieve the best case situation for bringing out a maximum number of evacuees we must recognize the implications for the government of Saigon.

The Saigon Government cannot consider a major evacuation of its people without admitting that its days are numbered.

The timing of the implementation of our decision is critical: it must come promptly after we have decided that a viable government in the south is doomed and before the general situation has deteriorated to the point that an evacuation effort is not possible. If refugee evacuation begins while the Saigon government is viable, the subsequent demoralization and panic are likely to trigger a precipitous collapse. On the other hand if the evacuation begins when the communists are ready to enter Saigon, very few people will have the opportunity to escape. Action taken either too soon or too late could lead to a repeat in Saigon on a larger scale of what happened in Danang and Nhatrang. (See Tab A for a description of likely events during a worst case scenario.)

Congressional inaction or negative action as of April 19 on the President's Vietnam assistance program could play a critical role in sealing the fate of the Saigon Government. In anticipation of the April 19 cut off, certain decisions are necessary so that subsequent contingency planning can begin.



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By KOH, NARA, Date 2/10/80

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After setting forth the magnitude of the problem and the assets we have for dealing with it, this paper addresses four issues: 1) Is our evacuation planning for Americans proceeding at the appropriate speed? 2) Will Vietnamese be included in our evacuation effort? 3) Are we willing to commit American military force to an evacuation effort? 4) Are there diplomatic alternatives we might pursue to promote an evacuation program and possibly avoid US military involvement?

II. DISCUSSION

A. Magnitude of a Possible Evacuation

As of April 16 there are 3,946 American citizens in Viet-Nam, down from 5,750 as of March 31. Ambassador Martin is presently preparing a time table to cut the total number of official Americans to 1,250 by April 20. There are presently 1,297 US Government in employees in Viet-Nam and 1,065 contract employees. (See Tab B for a comparison with figures of last week.) The U.S. also considers among its potential evacuees 4,107 other foreigners, including diplomats, ICCS members, and third country nationals working for the U.S. Government or other American organizations. The Ambassador has been urging the rapid departure of all nonessential people in these categories. While the number of Americans and other foreigners is large, the logistics for moving these groups of people do not present an impossible problem, unless the circumstances are critical.



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
The key question is the movement of the Vietnamese: whether the U.S. will become involved in an evacuation effort; if so, how many Vietnamese should we include, and the categories of these Vietnamese. There are two principal reasons why the U.S. should become involved in an evacuation of Vietnamese. First, we have a moral obligation not only to those Vietnamese who have worked for the U.S. Government and American companies but also to those who were convinced by our years of psychological operations to serve in the army and government of South Viet-Nam and believe that they could not live under communist rule. On the international level other nations will see in our handling of this issue how the U.S. deals with the people of a country which has long been involved with us. At the same time we must recognize there could be difficulties (racial, economic background of emigres, possible opposition by the U.S. labor interests) in bringing a large number of Vietnamese to the U.S. Congressional reaction to this problem is as yet uncertain. Both the North Vietnamese and the PRG have stated their opposition to the departure of large numbers of Southerners. Further, there has to date been no outpouring of international sympathy to the plight of the Vietnamese -- which will place the burden on the U.S. either for ultimate resettlement or influencing other governments to assist.

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Nobody knows the number of Vietnamese who might seek to leave their country if given the opportunity. Estimates vary from 100,000 to upwards of 1,000,000. The number of Vietnamese who might flee will depend on both the severity of the political crisis at the time and the rumors from Danang about what is happening to their former compatriots. For planning purposes we have used the figure of 200,000 as the number of potential evacuees. The category of evacuees which has caused most concern is the 17,600 Vietnamese employees of the U.S. Government with their estimated 112,000 to 150,000 dependents. (See categories at Tab C) The Embassy has been including this group in its daily report on potential evacuees. A second group which the Embassy has included in its planning estimates are the senior Vietnamese officials whose lives might be in danger, estimated at 17,200 including immediate families. The Embassy plans have omitted past U.S. Government employees (Est. 850,000), immediate family members of naturalized Americans of Vietnamese extraction and permanent residents in the U.S. (Est. 93,000), members of Vietnamese intelligence agencies (more than one million), families of middle or lower level GVN civil and military officials (an unknown number) who might feel their lives would be in danger under a communist government. Certainly



not all of these people would want to flee if given the opportunity, but the magnitude of potential evacuees presents organizational and logistical problems of gigantic proportions. Evacuation by category will be extremely complex.

B. Transportation Assets


The military evacuation plan consists of three phases which could be called into effect individually or in succession:

1. Evacuation by commercial air and sea facilities, augmented as necessary by military commercial charter as needed.
2. Evacuation by fixed wing military craft or naval vessels.
3. Evacuation by helicopter using selected landing sites in Saigon and other major towns.

The principal present means for departure from Viet-Nam is commercial aircraft. As of Wednesday, PanAm will be flying daily flights out of Saigon which should relieve some of the passenger backlog. Additional transportation assets presently not fully utilized include the back haul capacity of American military planes and ships bringing supplies to Saigon.

If in the future the decision is made to make use of the other means of departure, the following is a rough estimate of available assets:

- Commercial aircraft available for military charter (about a dozen commercial planes are generally located in the Pacific area and available for charter with 12 hours to three days notice; 12 planes at 200 passengers and one flight per day would provide a capacity of 2,400 persons per day; if the President declared a




national emergency, additional aircraft could be made available through the civil air reserve fleet.)

- Commercial sealift (8 ships are presently standing off the coast of Viet-Nam for possible evacuation, having been used recently for the movement of refugees between Vietnamese ports. AID is presently paying \$111,290 per day to keep all of these ships on standby; 4 or 5 additional commercial ships could be made available on about five days notice; this total of 13 ships could provide a capacity from 26,000 @ 2,000 persons per ship to 104,000 @ 8,000 per ship; the approximate turn-around time between Vung Tau and either Manila or Taipei would be five days).
- Military aircraft (75 to 80 planes are available on 24 hours notice from U.S. bases in the Western Pacific area; 75 planes at 200 passengers and one flight per day provides a capacity of 15,000 on a daily basis).
- Military sealift (Given five days' advance notice U.S. naval vessels operating between Taiwan and Singapore could provide surface lift capability for 27,200; earlier advance warning could bring additional ships from Japan and other Western Pacific locations).

In considering potential numbers of Vietnamese and transportation assets, there are a number of points which should be remembered:

- Maximum utilization of the transportation assets requires an orderly situation.
- The limiting factor will not be the number of planes and ships available but the limited number of places where they can be boarded (planes would presumably come almost exclusively to Tan Son Nhut and ships either up the narrow twisting Saigon River, a 7-hour trip, or to Vung Tau).
- The notification, transportation, and assembly of the selected individuals at the embarkation points on a scheduled basis presents a very complicated logistical problem.



- Widespread publicity about an evacuation plan or the evacuation of selected individuals is likely to cause panic among the rest of the population.
- Assembly points are likely to be congested with large numbers of people who want also to depart, making the use of lists or categories very difficult. Often these people could be armed, as was the case in Danang.
- There are already large numbers of people in refugee status at Vung Tau and Phu Quoc whose inclusion in any evacuation program will have to be considered. There are no estimates on the numbers of these people who might fit in any of the possible categories.

Military Combat Assets

If military transportation assets are used, combat forces might also be necessary. The number of American military units who would be called into action would depend on the nature of the military situation (and obviously Congressional restraints). Initially if there is a need for combat assistance, one or two reinforced Marine battalions might be called, for example, to hold or assist holding a portion of Tan Son Nhut airport. Additional support would be of an incremental nature, if the situation worsened. If the plan called for a sea evacuation via the Saigon River, a very large naval force might be required. Tactical air support would be used as necessary to cover any of these operations as necessary. During a helicopter evacuation a security force of approximately 800 men would be necessary to accompany the helicopters.

To execute an evacuation program, the following military



forces are immediately available:

- The 111 MAF elements (three Marine battalion landing teams of 1200 men each and three Marine battalions of 1,000 men each; Those Marines standing by off-shore are available immediately. Those units still in 'Okinawa on 24 hours' notice).
- Two brigades of the 25th Infantry Division (currently in Hawaii; available on three days' advance notice);
- 2 CVA's (attack carriers with 350 men available; with a response time of 13 to 30 hours).
- U.S. Air Force TACAIR (8 squadrons in the Pacific Region which could begin operations on immediate notice).

D. Onward Destination for Evacuees


The first destination for Vietnamese evacuees will be temporary collecting points in neighboring countries of the Western Pacific area and possibly in the U.S. The refugees would remain at these sites from several weeks to several months while arrangements were being made for their permanent resettlement. Any massive evacuation program will require advance planning. Foreign governments where refugees might be sent for interim settlement cannot be notified until a decision is made to undertake an evacuation program because of the need to maintain secrecy. There is also massive logistical planning necessary to preposition the food and shelter requirements at each of the temporary sites. We will have to undertake a coordinated plan to approach charitable organizations for their assistance at the refugee camps.



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We must also consider an approach to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee for European Migration, and other nations for their assistance in the eventual resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees.




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III. The Situation in Viet-Nam

There are four possible situations which could develop during the coming weeks: 1) military success for the Saigon Government which will allow them to hold the southern areas (the ideal situation); 2) gradual deterioration of the military situation dooming the Saigon Government, but with a reasonably long period of calm which will permit an orderly evacuation (best case evacuation situation; 3) a similar gradual deterioration in the military situation leading to an end in Saigon's rule, but with a shorter calm period before the North Vietnamese move into the city (the Phnom Penh model); 4) a sudden precipitous disintegration in the Saigon Government which prevents the implementation of any orderly evacuation plan (the worst case or the Nha Trang model). The longer the period of time after the implementation of an evacuation plan, the greater the likelihood that a large number of selected Vietnamese can be evacuated.

If intelligence sources indicate that the South Vietnamese have a good opportunity to stabilize the military situation, any decisions on evacuation plans which are made public or any unusually large number of departures from Saigon will contribute to the downfall of the GVN. Timing is of utmost importance: for maximum success the implementation must begin promptly after intelligence sources have indicated Saigon is doomed -- and before it is too late to be effective.



IV. Issues for Decision

There are four basic issues for consideration: 1) Is the evacuation of Americans proceeding with sufficient speed? 2) Are we going to undertake a program for the evacuation of Vietnamese? 3) Are we prepared to use U. S. military force to support an evacuation program? 4) Are we interested in pursuing the diplomatic options to promote an evacuation program and thereby avoid the use of U. S. military force? When considering each of these issues, the objective should be to take all steps to promote the best case evacuation situation and avoid the worst case situation, or if confronted with it, deal with it as effectively as possible.

A. Is the evacuation of Americans proceeding with sufficient speed?

- Option 1:
- a. Reduce the official American presence to 1,250 persons by April 20 and hold at that level until the situation changes.
 - b. Maintain the official American presence at 1,250 but take strong measures to reduce the number of non-official Americans (presently about 1,400) and other foreigners (presently about 3,500) for whom we have evacuation responsibility, possibly even informing them that we would not be able to guarantee their safety in an emergency. We might offer to assist the Ambassador through application of pressure from here on selected groups.
 - c. Inform the Ambassador to begin planning now to cut the total number of official Americans beyond the 1,250 figure down to an even more manageable total. 1,250 remains a large number of potential



evacuees, especially considering the number of other Americans and aliens for whom we have a responsibility. These further reductions could be used to influence other groups to leave. This would also send a signal to Thieu that we thought the end was in sight.

Option 2: Recognize that an orderly phasing out of the last Americans in Viet-Nam will require the support of certain high level GVN officials and offer to work out a plan with them for the concurrent departure of their families along with those individuals we wish to evacuate. This option might be used in the absence of a generalized evacuation program for Vietnamese. It might be attempted when the situation seemed nearly hopeless, but there remained too many Americans to evacuate safely. It would be very tricky to implement as evidenced in Danang where families and friends of officials nearly swamped the evacuation barges.

Option 3: Follow up on the Communist's statement that they would support the orderly evacuation of all Americans and attempt to work out an arrangement with them. If we have no intention of trying to evacuate Vietnamese and the capture of Americans is likely, we might wish to pursue this option.

B. Are we going to undertake a program for the evacuation of Vietnamese? What size program are we to consider? Should we be working for a general evacuation program or one using a priority list of categories of people?


Option 1: Waive immigration requirements for those Vietnamese in the U. S. and third countries or who can escape Viet-Nam on

their own, but take no actions to implement a massive evacuation program (either as a conscious decision or by delaying a decision until after it is too late).

Option 2: Set a target for evacuees at a figure such as 50,000 to be divided among families of American citizens, Vietnamese employees of the U. S. Government, and a few selected GVN officials. This might prove the best solution if time is short or there is Congressional opposition to a larger program. If we are unable to organize a general evacuation program for all Vietnamese who choose to flee, the smaller and more selective the program, the simpler the organizational effort to extract the selected individuals. A smaller evacuation can probably be kept quiet longer, but once known could trigger panic and perhaps greater bitterness by those who have been excluded.

Option 3: Make plans based on the Embassy's estimates of about 167,000 Vietnamese including families to whom we have some obligations and who might be endangered under a Communist regime. The Embassy estimates included some of the families of U. S. citizens, key intelligence personalities, employees of the U. S. Government, and senior Vietnamese officials. Since the Embassy can develop a better picture of potential evacuees than we in Washington, we should support the Embassy proposals for numbers and categories.

Option 4: Set a target for evacuees at a figure such as 200,000, allowing more flexibility in the categories and attempting to include some former USG employees, business and community leaders, and other desirable immigrants. A larger program of this type will take longer to implement and might more successfully be coupled with an international effort to support Vietnamese refugees.



Option 5: Plan for a general evacuation of those Vietnamese who choose to depart, but recognize that we will have no control over who or how many go. This approach would include a strong international appeal for assistance in the permanent resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees. All decisions on ultimate destinations, including the option of returning to Viet-Nam, would be made at the interim relocation sites, including possible locations in Viet-Nam such as Phu Quoc. While anyone who wanted might leave Viet-Nam, we could set a limit on the number of immigrants to the U. S. at some figures such as 200,000 and be selective in our choice of refugees.

C. Contingent upon Congressional approval, are we prepared to use military force in support of an evacuation program? Should the executive branch place to self-imposed limit on the size of this force?

Option 1: Avoid the use of U. S. military combat forces for any action on the ground in Viet-Nam except for the evacuation of American citizens. Unless there were strong GVN support for an evacuation or an interim government that wanted to eliminate undesirables, it is unlikely that we could offer much support for an evacuation program without the contingency of some military participation.

Option 2: Plan for the contingency that some American military units might be needed for the evacuation of Vietnamese, but the Executive Branch would place its own limitation on the number of troops and duration of stay, recognizing that if we exceeded these limitations we would end the evacuation. The initial input of force would be small, possibly two battalions at a landing site, and increased as the situation demanded -- up to a certain point. This situation might also



result from an agreement with Congress. Whatever the circumstances, it would be important that the limitations remain secret in order that the military forces maximize their presence.

Option 3: Recognize from the beginning that our actions to evacuate large numbers of people from Viet-Nam are likely to be costly, but make detailed preparations for a maximum effort. In addition to trying to hold airports or port areas, one variation of this option might include a phased withdrawal from large beach heads where people would be given the opportunity to leave in an orderly fashion. Another might be the temporary imposition of a U. S. military government on the city of Saigon. The number of troops required would depend upon whether U. S. soldiers were engaged in combat with GVN troops, Communist troops, or both.

D. Are we interested in pursuing diplomatic options to promote an evacuation program and avoid the use of U. S. military force?

Option 1: Press the Thieu Government or its anti-Communist successor in Saigon for an orderly evacuation of threatened individuals: Large segments of the military and police force would be offered the opportunity to flee to another country in exchange for their cooperation. If Congress fails to approve additional aid, we might want to approach Thieu immediately and point out the gravity of the problem and importance of a cooperative effort to save as many lives as possible.

Option 2: Promote the replacement of the Thieu Government by a group which would seek an accommodation with the other side, but in exchange for our acquiescence, would allow for the development of a program to exile those Vietnamese who would be considered undesirables in the future.



- Option 3: Urge Thieu to work to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord between the Vietnamese parties as called for in Article 12 of the Paris Agreement of January 1973. Make an evacuation program one of the conditions for our support or Saigon's cooperation in the National Council.
- Option 4: Threaten the use of force on the one hand and offer diplomatic incentives on the other to the North Vietnamese to ensure an orderly evacuation. We would have to have Congressional support to follow up on these initiative. Whether Hanoi accepted our proposal would depend the military situation in the South, the political situation in Hanoi, and American popular support for the initiative.



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AN EVACUATION SCENARIO

I. Assumptions.

A. We are talking about the evacuation of Americans, the total of whom is now approximately 5,000, but which is expected to be cut to 1,250 in the near future; and, for planning purposes, 200,000 Vietnamese (a low figure if one considers the number of Vietnamese and their families who might be endangered by a Communist takeover).

B. Current military and political considerations will not permit the Thieu Government, a successor, or an aroused RVNAF to allow the peaceful departure of large numbers of Vietnamese.

C. The United States will not implement the final evacuation of Americans and a sizable number of Vietnamese until Saigon is seriously threatened (as Phnom Penh was threatened). However, circumstances permitting we will contrive to encourage the GVN to issue exit permits to Vietnamese to whom we give the highest priority.

II. The Likely Evacuation Scenario.

While an intensive effort will reduce the number of Americans in the coming days, it will not reduce significantly the much larger number of Vietnamese. If the security situation deteriorates or is perceived to deteriorate -- aircraft will refuse to land in Tan Son Nhut and ships will refuse to navigate the Saigon River. Pressure and special guarantees might keep them operating longer than they would desire, but the loss of one or two aircraft or ships to hostile fire will make civilian air and sea travel impossible.

Military commercial charter might supplement commercial transport or it might be called upon if commercial travel is no longer possible because of security threats. The implementation of more than a very limited military commercial charter

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evacuation is unlikely because the GVN would be acknowledging defeat by permitting large numbers of people to leave the country and waiving the ordinary exit requirements. Any change in GVN emigration policy would likely trigger panic in Saigon. Likewise, these charter flights could not operate without protection if security conditions deteriorated.

Presumably at about the time when commercial craft refuse to travel to Viet-Nam the situation would be judged sufficiently dangerous to provoke the decision to evacuate a maximum number of Americans and Vietnamese. Without the commercial facilities, the Ambassador would call for U.S. military air and sealift support, supplemented possibly by a limited form of military charter. Unless there were a guarantee of adequate population control measures the Defense Department would need to support its military evacuation elements with combat elements (Marines at Tan Son Nhut and other airports; naval forces on the Saigon River and in ports; and air resources covering the other elements).

Using all available land and sea assets and assuming a stable, non-hostile situation and proper organization, 200,000 persons could possibly be extracted in three to five days. However, we could not expect a stable situation to hold nor organizational efforts to be effective for more than a very short time. Even under ideal circumstances organizing the assembly of the selected people at specific evacuation points would be an extremely complicated task. Given a deteriorating security situation, public awareness in Viet-Nam of a limited evacuation program, and knowledge of the presence of U.S. military forces in support only of an evacuation effort, public order would continue to disintegrate. Members of the Army and police would desert their stations, transportation and public services would cease being reliable, and the urge to escape would dominate the minds of more of the populace. Each action in itself would trigger a further downward spiral of disintegration. The evacuation effort could come under fire from North Vietnamese units or disgruntled South Vietnamese units or both. As the situation deteriorates, additional U.S. military forces, possibly several divisions,

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would have to be called into Viet-Nam, but that might still prove insufficient.

An orderly evacuation effort under such circumstances would be nearly impossible. Arrangements for notifying, transporting, and processing large numbers of selected individuals would be extremely difficult. It would likely become an every-man-for-himself situation. If an evacuation continued, the evacuees would be those who were either nearest the evacuation points or had shot and bribed their way there. The only way that public order might be restored would be the temporary imposition of American military control over the city.

If the security situation deteriorated extremely rapidly -- or the decision is made to use minimum U.S. military units -- an evacuation by military helicopters from selected assembly points around Saigon and other key centers might be the only option available to extricate stranded Americans. As the Ambassador has noted, in view of the security force requirement aboard the helicopters one helilift cycle would permit evacuation of about 1,300 people. While a first cycle might be successful, further attempts could have disastrous consequences. Because a helicopter evacuation would have to be quick and well-coordinated, it would be difficult to assure the inclusion of all the Americans still in the city. Very few Vietnamese could be included in the form of an extraction.



III. Conclusions.

A. This worst case scenario presents a grim picture. The evacuation of the entire American community is going to be a difficult task; the evacuation of any number of Vietnamese nearly impossible.

B. The various commercial air and sea assets and military commercial backhaul offer the best opportunity to move large numbers of people in the most orderly and peaceful manner. The introduction of U.S. military transportation assets with ground security forces could have disastrous consequences already described. After the first few days of this stage of evacuation, an increasing disintegration in public order

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would impede a successful evacuation. The use of helicopters might facilitate the extraction of Americans but could not include more than a very small group of Vietnamese. It is doubtful that more than one cycle of helicopters (1,300 evacuees) could be used with any safety.

C. The number of Americans presently in Saigon remains too large to extricate successfully under conditions of deteriorating security. With a goal of 1,250 Americans at the earliest possible date, all non-essential Americans should be urged to depart immediately.

D. The evacuation of 200,000 Vietnamese according to categories will be impossible. Efforts to permit the departure of all categories of presently documentable Vietnamese (e.g. relatives of U.S. citizens) should be expedited. Documentation requirements should be simplified and processing expedited whenever possible.

E. During any operation involving U.S. military combat forces there could be many casualties among Americans and Vietnamese evacuees as well as among the protective forces and the Vietnamese populace.

F. If we have decided to give high priority to the safe evacuation of Americans and any substantial number of Vietnamese, we must avoid this worst case scenario.




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EMERGENCY AND EVACUATION: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POTENTIAL EVACUEES
(Americans and Aliens)

	<u>April 7</u>	<u>April 16*</u>
Total Number of Potential Evacuees:	173,719	175,744
A. Amcit Evacuees:	5,422	3,946
1. DOD:		
Employees (civilian)	569	414
Employees (military)	155	178
Dependents (civ. & mil.)	333	104
2. Other USG:		
Employees	839	710
Dependents	283	124
3. Residents:	800	840
4. Transients:	62	62
5. American Press:		
Employees	62	84
Dependents	8	3
6. U.S. Contractors:		
DOD	956	824
USAID	278	241
Dependents (DOD & USAID)	1,007	362
B. Alien Evacuees:	168,297	171,798
1. Dependents of Amcits	500 (est.)	1,227
2. Foreign Diplomatic Mission	1,346	1,472
3. Third Country Nationals (USG Employees)		
Employees	14	14
Dependents	9	24
4. TCNS - Contractors:		
USAID:		
Employees	331	247
Dependents	250	11
DOD:		
Employees	18	234
Dependents	None known	274
5. Other: Official Aliens and Other Aliens	1,178	Category dropped

*In addition to departures, many of the changes reflect a refinement in the statistics or the recent registration of people previously unknown to the Embassy.



	<u>April 7</u>	<u>April 16*</u>
6. TCN - Press:		
Employees	42	42
Dependents	3	3
7. U.S. Mission Local		
National Employees:	14,000	17,600
Estimated Dependents	100,000-150,000	150,000
8. ICCS:	606	250
9. Aliens working for U.S. companies:	(Unstated presumably part of No. 5)	400



CA GORIES OF POTENTIAL EVAC IS

(Including Vietnamese)

FOREIGN


American Citizens	3,946*
Foreign Diplomatic Mission Personnel	1,472*
ICCS	250*
Third Country Nationals	1,249*
Dependents of American Citizens in Vietnam. (Figure includes some Vietnamese, for whom parole authority was recently granted.)	1,227*

VIETNAMESE

1. Present Employees of the U.S. Govt. 17,600*
Their Dependents 112,000 - 150,000*
 2. Close Vietnamese relatives of U.S.
citizens or Permanent residents
of Vietnamese extraction. (Estimated
number of dependents based on Ameri-
cans of Vietnamese origin in the
U.S.; parole authority is being re-
quested for this category.) 93,000
 3. OSA List of Key Intelligence
Personalities and Families 3,000**
- Former Vietnamese employees of USG
and their dependents. (Based on
estimates of high point employ-
ment in Vietnam of all U.S.
Agencies. Many of these people
might still be working for the
U.S., but former employees from
other time periods would more
than compensate for them.) 850,000
- Employees of U.S. Government
Invited Contractors 48,000**

*Embassy figures for April 16

**Embassy estimates of April



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Employees of Western non-governmental organizations including the press and volags (and families)

8,000**

Employees (and families) of Vietnamese security agencies whose lives might be in danger because of their past work (CIA estimate: including National Police Special Branch, Special Reconnaissance Group, and Hoi Chanh program ralliers.)

1,968,000

Other GVN middle level officials, army officers, business and educational leaders and their families.

600,000

4. Prominent Vietnamese citizens and their families

17,200**

